Litigation in the District of Columbia
In Campbell, Judge Bryant found in favor a class of pretrial detainees, or "unsentenced residents," 5 of the DC Jail, who complained of the conditions of their confinement. Judge Bryant held that there existed a plethora of problems at the facility due to severe overcrowding, in addition to violations of DC building, plumbing, and health codes. 6 Jackson involved a class of convicted inmates complaining of those same conditions. In Jackson, Judge Bryant analyzed the evolving standards of the Eighth Amendment, and although he did not draw a line determining what level of perceived mistreatment might constitute a constitutional deprivation of rights, he did hold that, wherever that point may be, the situation in the jail was undoubtedly unconstitutionally cruel and unusual. constituted violations of their Eighth Amendment rights. Later efforts by the district court to monitor those decrees proved problematic, and in 1987, the district court imposed a civil contempt sanction against the District and issued an order enjoining the U.S. Attorney General from designating any future prisoners for detention in DC"s Lorton prison facility. 9 At the same time, in another matter, the court went so far as to order a population cap at DC"s Occoquan facilities, following riots there in 1986. 10 Both the injunction in the former case and the population cap in the latter were vacated and remanded by the D.C. Circuit.
11
Perhaps the most interesting case of the series is Marsh v. Barry, 12 which arose from inmates" complaints subsequent to an inmate-caused fire in 1983. After a brief volley with the court of appeals, the district court held that a prison riot can be both foreseeable and foreseen as a result of overcrowding. The court also determined that damages action was appropriate, rather than an order for injunctive relief, both because of the limited bounds of relief that the Circuit allowed, and also because the court determined that any such order was likely to be ignored or otherwise prove inadequate, as demonstrated by the persistent litigation of similar issues since Campbell and Jackson. 13 
Finally, Women Prisoners v. District of Columbia
14 presented the first case in the District inviting scrutiny of the specific treatment of female inmates, particularly sexual harassment by guards. The court found 15 that the obviousness of the sexual harassment that occurred amounted to deliberate indifference to the prisoners" treatment, and therefore rose to the level of a violation of their Eighth Amendment rights.
Supreme Court Precedent
The Supreme Court has developed a framework for Eighth Amendment violations arising from prison conditions. In 1976, the Court determined that "deliberate indifference" towards inmates" medical needs qualifies as one such violation. 16 Five years later, the Court decided the hallmark case Rhodes v. Chapman, 17 which specifically addressed the situation of prison overcrowding that lay at the heart of much of the litigation in the District of Columbia. In Rhodes, the Court adopted a totality test for the circumstances of confinement, 18 18 Id. at 347 ("Prison conditions "alone or in combination, may deprive inmates of the minimal civilized measure of life's necessities"); see also Hutto v. Finney, 437 U. S., at 687 ("We find no error in the court's conclusion that, taken "must not involve wanton and unnecessary infliction of pain, nor may they be grossly disproportionate to the severity of the crime warranting punishment." 19 Furthermore, the Court noted that, to the extent possible, objective factors will control over the "subjective views" of district court judges. 20 The Court revisited the issue ten years later in two cases. First, in Wilson v. Seiter, 21 the Court required plaintiffs to establish intent on the part of the defendants, to inflict cruel and unusual punishment. 22 The requisite intent, "deliberate indifference," lies between negligence and malice. 23 Thereafter, the Court clarified in Harmelin v. Michigan 24 that to find an Eighth Amendment violation plaintiffs must show their treatment constitutes both cruel and unusual punishment. 25 In short, after these cases, courts looked to "consistent and repeated failures over an extended period, coupled with actual knowledge of the substandard conditions and the harm they may cause, to establish deliberate indifference," 26 and will aggregate the conditions of confinement, then applying "realistic yet humane standards" in its analysis of those conditions to test whether the alleged treatment of prisoner plaintiffs is both cruel and unusual. 27 Most recently, the Court clarified its deliberate indifference standard in Farmer v. Brennan, 28 holding that prison officials must both know and disregard "an excessive risk" to an inmate"s health or safety to be held liable for an Eighth Amendment violation. 29 This test can be met by proved failure to act despite knowledge of such conditions.
Subsequent Congressional Action
Two years after Farmer, Congress passed the Prison Litigation Reform Act, 31 which, among other things, requires that prior physical injury must be shown for an inmate to bring a justiciable Eighth Amendment claim. 32 However, it remains that "denial of adequate care for serious mental health needs may constitute deliberate indifference" under the constitutional standards laid out by the Supreme Court. 33 Furthermore, given the D.C. District Court"s decision in Marsh, it remains plausible that a court could find that physical injury is a foreseeable consequence of certain psychologically abusive conditions. Finally, it is worth noting that the National Capital Revitalization and Self-Government Improvement Act of 1997 34 
